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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Policy Research Working Paper 5169
Malawi has experienced several catastrophic droughts 
over the past few decades. The impact of these shocks 
has been far reaching, and the resulting macroeconomic 
instability has been a major constraint to growth and 
poverty reduction in Malawi. This paper describes a 
weather risk management tool that has been developed 
to help the government manage the financial impact of 
drought-related national maize production shortfalls. The 
instrument is an index-based weather derivative contract 
designed to transfer the financial risk of severe and 
catastrophic national drought that adversely impacts the 
government’s budget to the international risk markets. 
Because rainfall and maize yields are highly correlated, 
changes in rainfall—its timing, cumulative amount, and 
distribution—can act as an accurate proxy for maize 
losses. An index has been constructed using rainfall 
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data from 23 weather stations throughout Malawi and 
uses daily rainfall as an input to predict maize yields 
and therefore production throughout the country. The 
index picks up the well documented historical drought 
events in 2005, 1995, 1994, and 1992 and a weather 
derivative contract based on such an index would have 
triggered timely cash payouts to the government in those 
years. This innovative risk management instrument was 
pioneered in 2008/2009 by the Government of Malawi, 
with the assistance of the World Bank, and was a first 
for a sovereign entity in Africa. Several piloting seasons 
will be necessary to understand the scope and limitations 
of such contracts, and their role in the government’s 
strategy, contingency planning, and operational drought 
response framework.  1
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1. Introduction 
 
Malawi has experienced several catastrophic droughts over the past few decades.  The recurrent 
weather shocks have resulted in low economic growth and significant volatility from year to 
year.  This is because Malawi’s agriculture constitutes about 40 percent of the economy, largely 
smallholder farming and mostly rain-fed maize production.   As a result, weather patterns deeply 
affect agricultural production and Malawi’s GDP. Further since the Malawian diet is 
overwhelmingly dominated by maize consumption, which comprises over 50 percent of total 
calories, changes in maize production also have a direct impact on food security.  Most recently, 
the adverse weather in 2001, 2002 and 2005 brought dramatic swings in agricultural output in the 
past decade.  
 
In recent years the Government of Malawi has been pursuing innovative approaches towards 
developing a comprehensive national food security strategy.  In this context, the World Bank has 
been exploring the use of ex-ante market-based instruments to assist the government to manage 
the financial risks associated with volatility in maize production.  This paper discusses an 
innovative instrument that has been designed to assist the Government of Malawi in managing 
the risks associated with the impact of weather shocks. The next section highlights some of the 
indirect costs faced by Malawians as a result of these shocks.  Section 3 provides background 
information on the design and limitations of index-based drought risk management instruments. 
Section 4 describes the development of such an instrument for Malawi. Section 5 provides some 
steps ahead and conclusions.  
 
2. The impact of weather shocks on the economy in Malawi  
 
Economic growth in Malawi has been elusive, reaching no more than 2 percent average during 
the period between 1999 and 2005, with significant volatility from year to year (Table 1 and 
Figure 1).  Much of the poor performance has been the result of the recurrent weather shocks on   3
smallholder agricultural production, notably maize production.
1  Malawi’s economy is highly 
vulnerable to adverse weather shocks not only because of the direct impact on agricultural 
production (and GDP), but also due to the indirect impact on government finances resulting from 
the unanticipated need for emergency interventions (which may translate into increased domestic 
borrowing), and increased pressure on the current account because of the need for exceptional 
food imports (World Bank, 2007a).  In fact, every few years there is an unexpected crisis in 
Malawi, usually because of the impact of adverse weather on agricultural production, GDP and 
public finances.   
 
The impact on government finances resulting from the weather shocks is evident from the 
experience during 2000 and 2004 in Malawi, when domestic public debt increased exponentially, 
and brought the country on the verge of a fiscal crisis.  In preparing the 2002/03 budget, the 
government did not set-aside resources to respond to the emerging food crisis (which resulted 
from the combination of localized drought and floods in 2001 and 2002), and eventually spent an 
unbudgeted 5 percent of GDP because of the need to provide food relief.  This was a 
combination of emergency imports of maize (amounting to 3.8 percent of GDP), and transfers to 
the Agricultural Development and Marketing Cooperation (ADMARC) and National Food 
Reserve Agency (NFRA) parastatals (1.2 percent of GDP).  The cost of the 2002/03 maize 
imports compounded the already rising interest costs, leading to a rapid increase in domestic 
expenditures and the crowding out of discretionary (i.e. non-statutory) expenditures. Although 
government started borrowing on a large scale in 2001/02, the full effect of increased interest 
costs was not felt until 2003/04, when the domestic interest bill reached 9.1 percent of GDP, 
corresponding to a massive 40 percent of domestic revenues.  Even in 2005/06, when the 
government carefully planned its humanitarian response to the 2005 drought and included 
funding in its 2005/06 budget, the actual cost of the interventions turned out to be much higher 
than initially envisaged, resulting in a larger fiscal deficit (including grants) by 0.8 percent of 
GDP. 
 
In spite of the frequency of (weather) shocks in Malawi, only a small allowance is made in the 
budget for such contingencies.
2  As a result, shocks usually translate into higher domestic 
borrowing, and have a substantial impact on fiscal performance and macroeconomic stability.  
Further, the long-term impact of the volatility is substantial, as economic uncertainty hampers 
the country’s ability to generate and/or attract productive investments, to effectively compete in 
international markets, and, most important, to translate economic growth into employment and 
income generation that benefit those who need it most (World Bank, 2004; 2007a; 2007b).  High 
level of risk has been identified as an important explanation for slow growth in Africa in general 
(Collier and Gunning, 1999).  In fact, insufficient anti-shock action and finance has been a recipe 
for magnifying economic instability and other distortions, ending up costing far more in the 
long-term (Gelb and Eifert, 2006). As discussed above, such costs have been extremely high in 
the case of Malawi. 
 
                                                 
1 In addition to the lackluster performance of agriculture, the poor economic growth has been exacerbated by an 
even worse performance in manufacturing, partly due to exceptionally high government borrowing that ‘crowded 
out’ financing to the private sector.  Macroeconomic performance has improved substantially since 2005.  
2 A budget line for ‘unforeseen expenditures’ allows for such contingencies, amounting to about 1 percent of GDP. 
Malawi has traditionally relied on international assistance following climatic disasters.    4
Table 1: Malawi: Key Macroeconomic Indicators, 1999-2006
1 
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004   2005 2006
GDP (US$ million)
2 1,799 1,727 1,731 1,935 1,765 1,903  2,076 2,239
GDP  Growth  (%)    4.0 1.1  -4.2 2.1 3.9 5.1    2.1 8.5
Inflation  (eop)  28.1 35.4 22.1 11.5  9.8 13.7    16.5  9.9
Revenues and grants
3 24.1 27.4 23.5 26.7 34.7 37.5  42.5 42.1
Expenditures
3 29.7 33.2 31.2 38.1 42.5 42.9  43.5 43.5
Of which: Domestic interest payments  2.3 3.0 3.9 5.5 9.1 7.4  5.5 4.1
Overall balance (including grants)
3 -5.6 -5.8 -7.7 -11.6  -7.8  -5.4    -1.0  -1.4
Net domestic borrowing
3 2.1 1.2 6.9 11.8 7.7 3.0  0.3 -1.9
Domestic Debt
3  2.8  8.9 10.2 20.4 24.8 23.8    19.9 14.8
Gross reserves
4  4.2 4.4 3.3 1.4 1.4 1.1    1.4 1.6
Current account balance (% GDP, including grants) -8.2 -3.0 -6.8 -17.2 -7.9 -10.1  -16.2 -7.2
Exchange rate MWK /US$ (period average)  44.1 59.5 72.2 76.7 97.4 108.9  118.4 136.3
Notes: 1. National Accounts estimates have been revised in 2007.  All National Accounts figures in this report are based on the old national 
account series.  Preliminary estimates from the revised national accounts indicate that the level of GDP has been revised upwards with an 
average of around 38 percent.   
2. Calendar year basis.   
3. Percent of GDP, fiscal year basis (Malawi fiscal years run from July 1
st to June 30
th). 
4. Months of current year's imports of goods and non-factor services, calendar year basis. 
Source: Ministry of Finance, Reserve Bank of Malawi, and IMF and World Bank staff calculations  
In spite of the frequency of (weather) shocks in Malawi, only a small allowance is made in the 
budget for such contingencies.
3  As a result, shocks usually translate into higher domestic 
borrowing, and have a substantial impact on fiscal performance and macroeconomic stability.  
Further, the long-term impact of the volatility is substantial, as economic uncertainty hampers 
the country’s ability to generate and/or attract productive investments, to effectively compete in 
international markets, and, most important, to translate economic growth into employment and 
income generation that benefit those who need it most (World Bank, 2004; 2007a; 2007b).  High 
level of risk has been identified as an important explanation for slow growth in Africa in general 
(Collier and Gunning, 1999).  In fact, insufficient anti-shock action and finance has been a recipe 
for magnifying economic instability and other distortions, ending up costing far more in the 
long-term (Gelb and Eifert, 2006). As discussed above, such costs have been extremely high in 
the case of Malawi. 
 
The significant direct and indirect impacts of weather shocks highlight the need to plan for 
contingencies.  Possible remedial actions include (a) establishing contingency funds, and/or (b) 
increasing forex reserves for external shocks, and/or (c) piloting the use of national weather 
insurance.  The government could consider establishing a Contingency Reserve Fund (CRF), 
linked to the potential scale of shocks (at around 8-10 percent of GDP).  These funds are normal 
practice in developed economies, which are much less vulnerable to shocks. CRFs are important 
to lower vulnerability to shocks, as they can smooth out peak financing requirements, and are 
especially important for countries with limited or no capital market access.  However, there are 
also a number of issues related with them, and notably (i) difficulty in properly accounting for 
CRFs; (ii) challenges related to asset management and investment strategy of the CRFs; and 
most important, (iii) CRFs may create corruption and governance issues, especially in weak 
                                                 
3 A budget line for ‘unforeseen expenditures’ allows for such contingencies, amounting to about 1 percent of GDP. 
Malawi has traditionally relied on international assistance following climatic disasters.    5
institutional environment (such that the CRF becomes a slush fund for unauthorized 
expenditure).  An alternative would be to accumulate additional foreign exchange reserves.  This 
would allow the government to run down reserves as a first line of defense to buffer against most 
shocks without reserves disappearing.  While this strategy removes most of the risks inherent in 
establishing a CRF, increasing reserves would also entail substantial sterilization costs, and 
therefore could only take place gradually.  However for a developing country like Malawi, both 
approaches involve earmarking significant capital to cover events that happen infrequently and 
therefore incur high opportunity costs of scarce funds that could be used more productively in 
other government programs. An innovative and complementary approach would be to pilot the 
use of insurance-like instruments and explore the potential financial advantages of leveraging 
limited resources by transferring a portion of Malawian drought risk to well-diversified 
commercial portfolios. 
 
3. Index-based drought risk management contracts 
 
Recent developments in international risk markets imply that the government can buy an index-
based weather risk management contract to transfer the financial risk of severe and catastrophic 
national drought that adversely impacts the government’s budget to the international risk markets 
(Hess and Syroka, 2005; Ibarra, et al., 2005; also see Box 1).  Index-based risk transfer 
approaches are not insurance in the traditional sense where the insured party is compensated for 
the precise monetary loss that can be proved to have occurred.  Rather the protection is based on 
the performance of a specified index during the contract period in relation to a specified trigger, 
where the index is designed to correlate as closely as possible with the underlying risk (which in 
Malawi concerns the level of maize output).  Payouts are automatically made whenever this 
index crosses the specified contract threshold at the end of the contract period, without the need 
of loss assessments and checks to confirm the occurrence and magnitude of an actual loss (World 
Bank, 2005).  Often these contracts are legally structured as derivative contracts (rather than 
insurance contracts) although they still perform an insurance function (ISMEA, 2006).   
 
The counterparties to such transactions, the entities to whom the risk is transferred for a premium 
charge, are actors in the weather risk market. The weather market has grown in recent years, with 
over US$130 billion of risk transferred since its inception in 1997 (WRMA, 2009).  Weather 
market players, from both the reinsurance and financial communities are extremely interested in 
new, uncorrelated risks, such as Malawi’s, that can diversify and therefore enhance commercial 
risk portfolios.     6
 
In order to implement a successful weather risk transfer program, however, the primary technical 
precondition is that the data used to construct the underlying weather indexes must adhere to 
strict quality requirements, including: reliable and trustworthy on-going daily collection and 
reporting procedures; daily quality control; an independent source of data for verification; a long, 
clean, and internally consistent historical record to allow for a proper actuarial analysis of the 
weather risks involved—at least 25-30 years of daily data are ideally required, with less than 3-5 
percent missing (ISMEA, 2006).
4  The strict nature of these criteria is to ensure the underlying 
weather data used is objective, easily accessible and independently verifiable, thus ensuring that 
the balance of information between the two entities is shared equally and the nature of the risk 
being transferred is transparently communicated.  Experience shows that in most countries, 
including least developed countries (LDCs) that often have a long history of monitoring weather 
for agriculture, there is often enough weather stations and data to consider an index-based risk 
management approach at the national level with a little additional investment.
5   
 
One advantage of weather-indexed products, over products based on more subjective loss 
assessments, is that they create market access opportunities: the risk can be transferred from the 
country in question to the commercial portfolios of actors that actively seek this risk.  Secondly, 
by using a proxy measure of risk, such as rainfall that is available on a real-time basis, a contract 
                                                 
4 Nearly all weather contracts executed in the insurance and derivative market are written on data collected from 
official National Meteorological Service (NMS) weather stations; ideally, although not necessarily, these are 
automated stations that report daily to the United Nations World Meteorological Organization’s (WMO) Global 
Telecommunication System (GTS) in internationally recognized standard format and then undergo standard WMO-
established quality control procedures. 
5 Investments include, for example, upgrading some meteorological or communication equipment or by cleaning 
(i.e. in-filling missing or correcting erroneous entries) historical weather data (MDA Federal, 2006, 2007). 
Box 1. Examples of drought risk management contracts in Ethiopia and Mexico 
 
In 2005 the United Nations World Food Program, with technical assistance from the World Bank, entered into 
the first-ever humanitarian aid weather insurance contract with a leading European reinsurer (WFP, 2005; WFP 
2007; Syroka and Wilcox, 2006).  The contract provided contingency funding in case of an extreme drought 
during Ethiopia’s 2006 agricultural season.  The policy was based upon a calibrated index of rainfall data 
gathered from twenty-six weather stations across Ethiopia.  Payment would have been triggered when data 
gathered over a period from March to October indicated that rainfall was significantly below historic averages, 
pointing to the likelihood of widespread crop failure.  While the experimental pilot transaction only provided a 
small amount of contingency funding – a maximum payout of US$7.1 million for a premium of US$930,000 
paid by USAID – the funds would have been available to WFP at harvest-time which would allow for an 
intervention four to six months earlier than the traditional appeals-based system.  If a catastrophic drought had 
occurred in 2006, WFP would have used these funds to assist 65,000 households in November 2006. WFP are 
currently working with the Government of Ethiopia, World Bank and DFID on a second-phase drought risk 
financing program in Ethiopia for 2008-2010 (Hess, Wiseman and Roberson, 2006). 
 
Since 2003 the Government of Mexico, through its government-owned reinsurance company, has been insuring 
the drought disaster relief response budgets of federal and the state governments using rainfall index-based 
approaches.  The program was launched to address amongst other things financial disruptions to other 
government programmes to fund emergency responses as a result of weather shocks. In 2007 approximately 
1,900,000 hectares were insured against drought.  The risk was transferred to the international weather market 
through 230 weather stations for a sum insured of US$90 million at a premium of US$9.7 million.  The program 
was successfully tested in 2005 by a US$10.5 million triggered payout as a result of severe drought in several 
states (Agroasemex, 2006; Vasquez & Castellanos, 2007).   7
would secure timely and guaranteed funds for the government if a contractually specified severe 
and catastrophic shortfall in precipitation occurs during the agricultural season.  These products 
can be settled as soon as the data is received and verified, without having to rely on time 
consuming field-level assessments and often subjective loss adjustment processes to assess 
losses, such as those required for traditional insurance products (ISMEA, 2006), or in the case of 
traditional appeal-based humanitarian aid, on lengthy needs assessments (WFP, 2005; Hess and 
Im, 2007).   
 
Such a predictable source of early emergency financing in a time of crisis – together with 
improvements in the country’s early warning system – will give the government more flexibility 
in its drought preparedness and contingency planning, allowing an earlier response to shocks and 
saving overall costs: (a) directly, through more timely, informed and optimal operational 
decision making and; (b) indirectly, though a swift and sound response that reduces the overall 
negative developmental impact of a drought event and protects against the financial disruption of 
other government programs.  By securing supplemental resources, through risk transfer to the 
international risk markets, the government requires less contingency capital within its budget, 
which can be more effectively employed on other development programs. In addition, 
minimizing government dependence on traditional appeals-based emergency financing which is 
unpredictable and often untimely, promises greater dignity for the countries vulnerable to 
weather shocks.  Finally, discovering the market price of its drought risk will assist the 
government in making superior investment decisions with respect to managing and mitigating 
this risk within its portfolio and smoothing out drought-related expenditures across good and bad 
years.   
 
It is important to highlight that index-based weather risk management instruments should be 
viewed as just one of a growing number of tools and options in the government’s arsenal for 
managing food security and creating fiscal stability in the face of exogenous shocks. In order to 
maximize the cost benefits of timely and predictable financing, and reveal the value of 
transferring only severe and catastrophic drought risk, the program needs to be implemented 
within a comprehensive drought risk management strategy and contingency plan.   
 
In terms of shortcomings, one of the biggest limitations of index-based risk management 
products is the “basis risk”, defined as the potential mismatch between the index-based contract 
payout and the actual (maize production) losses in country, such that the payout does not 
adequately indemnify the government for their losses (Skees, Hazell & Miranda, 1999).  Basis 
risk can occur both ways: for instance, the country could experience a production shortfall (e.g. a 
maize deficit in Malawi) that is not picked up by the index and therefore does not trigger a 
payout; alternatively, a country could experience an overall national production surplus but the 
contract still triggers a payout.  
 
Furthermore, there are many variables not captured by the index which also affect level of 
production.  In the context of Malawi, for example, not all maize production deficits are caused 
by drought: flooding, civil strife, poor farm-management, pest infestations and inadequate seed 
and fertilizer supplies may be as important as deficit rainfall in triggering food emergency 
situations.  These risks are not captured by an index based on rainfall and cannot be objectively 
indexed for risk transfer.  Therefore this approach should only be applied in countries that have   8
made some progress and managing these additional risks. This limitation must be clearly 
communicated to all parties, and the underlying indices should be jointly developed with 
government partners to ensure that the index correlates as well as possible with the underlying 
risk, and to ensure appropriate country ownership and understanding of the approach. For the 
same reasons, wherever possible, the index should also be adapted from locally developed 
models that have been used by countries for some time, for example those used for early warning 
or production forecasting.  Nevertheless, basis risk, whether real or perceived, means that index-
based product offerings must always be accompanied by other risk management or mitigation 




A further disadvantage to such an approach is that the contract has an upfront, annual non-
refundable cost, which is additional to the cost of a full-scale government drought response.  
Donors often provide additional financial resources in response to a humanitarian crisis; hence, 
there may be a financial loss for the government if it takes on the cost of the insurance premium 
annually.  Such a perverse incentive against an ex-ante approach to risk management should be 
discussed with development partners to seek support in the payment of at least part of the 
premium.   
 
4. Developing an index-based weather derivative contract to manage drought risk in 
Malawi 
 
The very high correlation between maize yields and rainfall, and the substantial role played by 
maize production in the economy and in household food security in Malawi, suggest that a 
weather risk management contract for Malawi could be designed based on a maize production 
index.  The Malawi Department of Climate Change and Meteorological Services’, hereafter the 
Malawi Meteorological Services, rainfall data is of excellent quality, therefore satisfying a key 
prerequisite for risk transfer.   
 
The Malawi Maize Index 
 
The success of a weather risk management program for the Government of Malawi depends on 
the design of the underlying rainfall index on which the contract is based.  As outlined above, an 
index-based strategy does not cover the actual production loss of maize; instead it covers the 
shortfall in rainfall needed for adequate maize growth and development during a drought year.  
Because rainfall and maize yields are highly correlated, changes in rainfall – its timing, 
cumulative amount and distribution – can act as a proxy for maize losses.  Risk mitigating 
payouts are made from the market counterparty if the index crosses a specified trigger level at 
the end of the contract period, indicating situations where a loss is most likely to have occurred, 
i.e., payouts are made based on the index and not on the actual loss itself.   
 
The index proposed for Malawi – the Malawi Maize Index (MMI) – has been constructed using 
rainfall data from 23 weather stations throughout the country (Figure 2).  The MMI is based on 
the Malawi Meteorological Services’ (MMS) national maize yield assessment model, used by the 
                                                 
6 See Hess, Wiseman and Robertson (2006) for a discussion on contingency planning with respect to contingency 
financing.   9
government since 1992 to produce national maize production forecasts each February.  The 
MMS’s national maize yield assessment model is based on 75 weather stations and rain gauges 
throughout the country.  Because only 23 stations within the Malawi network satisfy the strict 
criteria for risk transfer to the weather risk market, the MMI only uses these 23 primary stations.  
Other than this difference, the methodologies and input parameters for the two models are 
precisely the same.   
 




The MMS (and MMI) model is a modified version of the FAO’s Water Requirement Satisfaction 
Index (WRSI) adapted to Malawian conditions, and uses daily rainfall as the only varying input 
to predict maize yields and therefore production throughout the country.
7  In this way the model, 
                                                 
7 WRSI is an indicator of crop performance based on water availability during the growing season, calculated using 
a crop water balance model. WRSI is defined as the ratio of seasonal actual evapotranspiration experienced by a 
crop to the crop’s seasonal water requirement; hence it monitors water deficits throughout the growing season, 
taking into account the stages of a crop’s evolution and the periods when water is most critical to growth. Studies by 
FAO have shown that WRSI can be related to crop yield deviations and these water-balance crop growth models 
have been extensively tested in many climates.  Indeed the WRSI model was initially developed for use with 
weather station data to monitor the supply and demand of water for a rain-fed crop during the growing season (FAO, 
1986; Frere and Popov, 1986). An adapted version of the FAO model is currently used by the Famine Early Warning 
Network (FEWS-NET) for their staple crop production early warning system for Africa.   10
and therefore the index, isolates the impact of only rainfall variability on maize production. 
Based on a water balance calculation, the model captures not only the total amount of rainfall 
received at each station, but also its distribution during the agricultural season and how these 
rainfall deficits impact maize yields.  By using such a model, a contract can be structured to 
reflect conditions which would impact national maize production and therefore food security.
8  
 
The rainfall and agricultural season in Malawi starts in October and finishes in April the 
following year, therefore daily rainfall from October to April is used to construct the MMI. The 
inter-annual variations in the MMI have a correlation coefficient of 75 percent with inter-annual 
variations in historical national maize yields for 1984-2008 as early as three months before 
harvest (Figure 3) and 93 percent with inter-annual variations the MMS’s national maize 
production forecasting model for 2000-2008.  
 
The limitations of the MMI model, as with all index-based strategies, relate to basis risk, as 
discussed above.  Thus, payouts are based on rainfall and not on actual maize production levels 
in the country.  With only 23 weather stations, evaluating rainfall levels for the country as a 
whole is still rather crude. One part of the country may experience drought while another 
experiences favorable rainfall. Similarly, farmers residing near a weather station may experience 
very different levels of rainfall and crop growth than farmers further away from the weather 
station. As such, although the 23 weather stations are distributed widely across the country 
(Figure 2), the current MMI provides a gross measure of drought for the country as a whole and 
is not appropriate for regional, localized or mild drought events. As more stations with automatic 
communication links become available, the index will improve further and can become more 
flexible.  Investments to improve the MMS’s model to better capture the impact of erratic and 
excess rainfall on maize yields will also improve the MMI and the accuracy of payouts when 
rainfall-related losses occur. 
 
To reinforce the point that the index is not a perfect indicator of national maize production, 
which is also impacted by other factors that are not captured by the index, the MMI is expressed 
in terms of the percentage deviation of the index from the long-term average, rather than absolute 









                                                                                                                                                             
(http://earlywarning.usgs.gov/adds).  Although there are many more robust and data-intensive physically-based crop 
models available, FEWS-NET adapted the FAO WRSI model for implementation in 2002 because of its limited data 
requirements and simplicity in operational use.   
8 The MMI has also been used in recent studies assessing the impact of agriculture input subsidy program in Malawi 
(Dorward et al., 2008; Denning et al. 2007).     11
Figure 3: The MMI -predicted production deviations from average versus historical total 
Malawi national maize production (MT) 
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The Contract Structure 
 
The annual premium price and the expected (annual average) payout for such a contract would 
vary with the trigger level (Table 2).  When establishing a price for a weather risk management 
instrument, market providers will take into consideration their own risk appetite, business 
imperatives, cost of risk and operational costs. While there are a variety of methodologies for 
pricing, in general the pricing for all contracts will contain an element of expected loss, plus 
some loading or risk margin that corresponds to a capital reserve charge required to underwrite 
the risk at a target level for the business, as well as administrative costs.  Therefore in general the 
premium charge for a contract can be broken down as follows:  
 
Premium = Expected Loss + Risk Margin + Administrative Costs 
 
Expected loss is the average, or expected payout of the contract in any given season.  In some 
years no payouts happen and in others payouts in excess of the expected loss can occur and the 
risk-taker must be compensated, through the risk margin, for this uncertainty and the internal 
provisions that must be made in order to honor these potentially large payouts.  The values of the 
expected loss and the risk margin must be established from historical weather data. The approach 
for determining the risk loading over the expected loss differs from risk-taker to risk-taker and 
many use a combination of methods to determine the risk margin included.  A sensible pricing 
methodology uses a risk measure such as the Value-at-Risk (VaR) of the contract to determine 
the risk margin.  A VaR calculation is aimed at determining the loss that will not be exceeded at 
some specified level of confidence often set at 99 percent, i.e. the maximum loss that will occur 
with a 1% probability or less.  It targets the potential extreme negative deviations in payouts for   12
the risk taker – regulators and rating agencies, for example, use such tail-risk measures in 
determining the capital a bank, (re)insurer or corporation is required to hold to reflect the risks it 
is bearing – and therefore the associated capital charge for taking on the risk.  Administrative 
costs are essentially the costs for the provider to run the business including charges for data, 
office costs, taxes and brokerage charges if necessary. 
 
Table 2: Example indicative premiums and payouts at different trigger levels for a sample 
contract with a US$20 million payout limit and a payout rate of $500,000 per MMI-% 
below the trigger 
Trigger Level  Expected Loss  Indicative Premium  Rate-on-Line
1 
95   US$  1,480,000    US$  2,600,000   13% 
90   US$  1,170,000    US$  2,200,000   11% 
85   US$  900,000    US$  1,700,000   9% 
80   US$  640,000    US$  1,300,000   7% 
Note 1: This table provides very tentative estimates of premium rates by trigger level the example contract; only 
through a competitive market-based process can the true price of Malawian weather risk be discovered. 
Note 2: The rate-on-line is defined as the premium divided by the maximum possible payout, in this example US$20 
million. 
 
The indicative premiums in Table 2 do not include administrative expenses and provide a simple 
illustrative example, using a straightforward return-on-VaR pricing approach and the historical 
data available
9, of how premiums may expect to vary with MMI thresholds (ISMEA, 2006).   
 
A simple example will clarify the operation of such a contract.  Consider that the government 
enters into a weather derivative contract structure based on the MMI.  The contract has a trigger 
level of 95 percent, i.e., a payout is only made if at the end of the agricultural season in April the 
MMI is calculated to be below the 95 percent trigger level (meaning that the season’s MMI value 
is 5 or more percent below its long term average, implying the total national maize production is 
also down due to deficit rainfall-related losses).  If the MMI is above 95 percent at the end of 
April no payment is made.  The contract is designed such that if the MMI is below the 95 percent 
threshold the government will receive US$500,000 for every percent point that the MMI is 
below 95 percent, up to a maximum payout limit of US$20 million.  The operation of such a 
contract is illustrated in Figure 4.   
 
The average payout, or expected loss of the contract, over 48 years is US$1.5 million (Table 2).  
For entering into this contract and transferring this expected loss to the market and securing the 
right to access contingency funds of up to US$20 million if there is a drought-related crisis as 
measured by the MMI, the government must pay an annual premium of approximately US$2.6 
million (Table 2).
10  From a donor perspective this is can be viewed as an opportunity to leverage 
US$2.6 million premium contribution into a US$20 million drought-response contribution in a 
                                                 
9 To calculate the indicative premium rates, R, excluding administrative expenses, the following basic equation is 
used: R = E(P) + * ( VaR99(P) – E(P) ), where E(P) is the 1962-2009 average payout of the contract, VaR99(P) is an 
estimate of the VaR at the 99% level of the potential payout – estimated by fitting a best-fit Beta General 
distribution to the historical MMI data from 1962-2009 – and  is the return-on-VaR risk loading, set at 7% for this 
illustrative example.  In reality market players will take factors such as data length, data quality, trends and forecasts 
into account when determining the final technical premium rate R and their own risk loading. 
10 This is a simple premium rate estimate. In fact only through a competitive process as part of a risk transfer 
arrangement can the real market price of Malawian drought risk be discovered.   13
worst case scenario where a severe shortfall in precipitation has occurred.  More importantly, as 
discussed above, such an ex-ante commitment enables the government to build a drought 
contingency plan well in advance of a drought event around the availability of the contract 
payout, which will ensure a better planned, more efficient and cost-effective disaster response.
11   
 
Figure 4: An example of a hypothetical MMI-based weather derivative payout structure, 
95 percent trigger level 
 
 
Had it been in place, a derivative contract based on such an index would have triggered cash 
payouts to the government most recently in 2005.  Going back to 1960, such a contract would 
have also made payouts in 1995, 1994, 1992, 1980 and 1970 (Figure 5). Such a contract would 
have paid out US$17.6 million in 1992, US$16.4 million in 1994, US$11.4 million in 1995 and 
most recently US$2.5 million in 2005 (Figure 5).  In all such cases, these payouts could have 
been used, for example, to finance maize purchases or price risk management instruments to cap 
the price of maize imports, or other humanitarian interventions.   
 
It is important to note that the premium is always greater than the expected loss; that is, Malawi 
would always pay more for the insurance than it expects to get back in payouts over the longer 
term.  However the additional value for Malawi of this contract that is not captured in these 
calculations is the financial savings the government would make by having access to guaranteed 
funds as early as May, enabling a timely response to a developing crisis and minimizing the 
potential disruption in grain supply into the country throughout the duration of the emergency 
response.   If these effects of a securing contingent funds through a weather derivative are taken 
                                                 
11 Furthermore the MMI can be monitored throughout the season, as real-time rainfall data is received, and the 
Government and partners can therefore monitor the likelihood of a payout at the end of April, and assess their 
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into account, over the long-term the cost benefit analysis of an annual market premium charge 
are likely to be significantly more favourable for Malawi
12. 
 
Figure 5: An example of historical payouts at the 95 percent trigger level  
 




























































































































































































































5. A pilot transaction for 2008/2009 agricultural season in Malawi 
 
In order to pilot this instrument, the Government of Malawi entered into an initial transaction 
that provided contingency funding in the event of extreme drought during the 2008/2009 
agricultural season.  The pilot aimed to test the feasibility and cost of transferring Malawi’s 
drought risk to the international risk markets, and did not aim to cover the entire financial 
magnitude of a potential drought response in the country.  In fact the 2008/2009 pilot only 
provided about US$5 million in coverage—for comparison, the cost of the 2004/2005 drought 
response in Malawi was over US$200 million for the government.
13  The trigger level selected 
by the government was the 90% threshold, targeting a more severe drought than the simple 
                                                 
12 For example, following the drought and low harvest in May 2005, Malawi imported between 200,000-300,000 
MT of maize into the country for distribution during the lean months that followed in January-March 2006.  Much 
of this maize was purchased on the spot market in South Africa in October-November 2008 and transported into the 
country for immediate distribution (Slater and Dana, 2006).  Had Malawi been in the position to purchase maize in 
June-July 2005, or ideally to purchase price risk management instruments that capped the maize import price for the 
months ahead it would have saved approximately US$80-110 per MT imported, using conservative estimates.   
Assuming similar market dynamics hold in other deficit production years, the saving gains through using a weather 
derivative payout to secure maize as early possible in deficit years could exceed the additional risk margin charged 
for the contract in the long-term. 
13 To support the initial pilot for the 2008/2009 agricultural season in Malawi DFID provided the premium to 
finance the payment of the risk-transfer premium on behalf of the Government.  Such a premium secured 
approximately US$5 million of drought-specific contingency funding. The actual market price of Malawi drought 
risk was not known until offers were collected from the market for the risk as part of a real transaction.     15
example given in the previous section and one more appropriate for an index-based risk transfer 
product. 
 
In addition to secure limited drought financing in a timely and objective manner, the objective of 
the pilot was to allow the government to establish a market price for its drought risk and to 
determine the best use for this type of instrument in their food security strategy in conjunction 
with other available risk management and mitigation tools.  In addition, the piloting of this 
approach also helped define the operational and legal implications for entering into this type of 
transaction and securing contingency funding not only for Malawi but also for other African 
governments.   
 
The actual transaction flow is shown in Figure 6.  The World Bank acted as intermediary in a 
national weather derivative transaction to the international market on behalf an International 
Development Agency (IDA) member country, which in this instance was the Government of 
Malawi.
14  That is, IDA entered into a derivative transaction with Malawi while simultaneously 
entering into a mirroring, back-to-back transaction with a market counterpart.  The World Bank 
also facilitated a competitive market process for Malawi’s drought risk and provided legal, 
administrative and technical support to the government for an actual transaction.  An 
independent third-party data verifier, with experience the weather derivative market, was 
contracted to quality control and clean the data in real-time as it was reported by the Malawi 
Meteorological Services. 
 





The rationale for World Bank intermediation for this landmark transaction is two-fold.  Firstly 
there is strong market preference for dealing with an experienced and familiar counterparty; this 
in turn would attract significantly more market players to participate in the tender, leading to 
more competitive pricing for the government.  By being the market face of the transaction 
increased confidence in the transaction and reduced start-up costs on both sides.  Secondly this 
introductory, market building function for the World Bank was viewed as a necessary investment 
to overcome market entry barriers for the government.  In addition, the government also received 
World Bank Treasury technical assistance so that it can take full control of the risk transfer 
                                                 
14 In June 2008, the World Bank’s Board of Executive Directors approved the decision to allow IDA to carry out this 
type of transactions.  The Malawi transaction was carried out in summer 2008, and represents the first time that IDA 

















Verification   16
portion of the program, without World Bank intermediation, after several years of successful risk 
transfer.
15   
 
In terms of timing, the derivative itself was purchased in October 2008, following counterparty 
selection through a competitive process led by the World Bank Treasury in August 2008.
16 
Given the small size of the transaction and the other financial risk management strategies 
available to the government at the time, the weather derivative was designed to secure early 
maize imports.  Timely purchases are essential to avoid huge volatility in grain prices and 
prevent the dislocation caused by severe shortages, while funds are mobilized to support the full 
disaster response.  In the event of severe drought, a payout would have occurred in early May 
2009 which would have been used to purchase a contingent maize import agreement
17 to speed 
maize into the country in a managed way.
18  In fact, in 2008/2009 the rains were good and no 
payout was made in May 2009.  Nonetheless, this transaction successfully tested the capacity of 
the Malawi Meteorological Services to transfer rainfall data in real-time to the standards required 
to the international market, and allowed the government ministries to become familiar with the 
legal and technical requirements of such agreements.   
 
Several piloting seasons beyond an initial phase will be necessary to fully grasp the role and 
flexibility of weather risk management instruments within the government’s strategy, and 
operational drought response as its national disaster risk management framework evolves.
19  The 
first pilot provided a foundation for continuing to manage catastrophic drought risks through 
insurance mechanisms. In addition, as future investments in the Malawi Meteorological Services 
and crop modeling are made
20, the risk transfer index itself will improve along with the 
government’s familiarity with the tool.   
                                                 
15 This takes the form of training visits from World Bank experts involved with all aspects of the transaction. There 
is also scope within the new World Bank Agricultural Development Programme Support Project to support training, 
capacity building and study tours for key Government stakeholders to secure local understanding and ownership of 
the contracting process. 
16 Swiss Re was selected to be the counterparty to the 2008/2009 transaction.  On October 20, 2008, Swiss Re 
announced that it had entered into a weather derivative contract with the International Development Association 
(IDA), the arm of the World Bank that helps the world’s poorest countries. Under the terms of the contract, Swiss 
Re would pay out up to US$5 million in the event that Malawi’s farmers suffer from a drought-related shortfall in 
maize  production. 
http://www.swissre.com/pws/media%20centre/news/news%20releases%202008/mi_ida_20081020.html 
17 In September 2005 the Government of Malawi, with technical assistance from the World Bank, piloted the used of 
a call option linked to the South Africa Future Exchange (SAFEX) white maize prices to cap the price of maize 
imports from South Africa for 60,000 MT of maize (see Slater and Dana, 2006). 
18 In this context, the World Bank is assisting the Government of Malawi to explicitly link the weather derivative to 
a broader price risk management strategy, which automatically places the weather derivative contract within the 
context of a broader risk management program (to strengthen the response of maize markets to production 
shortfalls).   
19 DFID earmarked funds to continue contributing to premium costs for the next agricultural seasons.  Other donor 
also signaled their interest in supporting the program. 
20 Investments in the observing and measurement infrastructure of Malawi’s Department of Climate Change and 
Meteorological Services (MMS) are necessary to improve the reliability of the index and the Government’s early 
warning system.  The Government has made provisions to invest in the MMS’s weather observing network and in 
crop modeling knowledge and capacity in the country through the new Agricultural Development Programme 
Support Project.  Investments in weather stations and their communication have many benefits for Malawi and the 
region including: better weather forecasting and climate monitoring, enhanced national agricultural and irrigation 




Climatic shocks are frequent in Malawi and constitute a major impediment to economic growth 
and poverty reduction.  Moreover, global climate change models suggest that future volatility in 
weather patterns in Sub-Saharan Africa are likely to become even more pronounced. Their 
impact goes far beyond the initial need for emergency relief, and the resulting macroeconomic 
instability has presented a major constraint to growth and poverty reduction in Malawi.   
 
This paper describes an innovative financial instrument, namely an index-based drought 
derivative contract, which could allow the Government of Malawi to transfer the financial risk of 
severe and catastrophic national drought to the international risk markets. It aims to enable 
Malawi to manage risks, rather than managing crises. The development of an this risk 
management instrument will create a new opportunity for the government to financially manage 
its budgetary exposure to drought and its impact on (maize production) risk using ex ante 
market-based instruments, complementing and enhancing the price and other risk management 
tools the government already has within its portfolio.  Through price discovery it will facilitate 
government and donor planning and preparedness for drought-related food shortages and, as an 
additional instrument, it will assist the government in developing a comprehensive and cost 
effective national food security strategy for each agricultural season.  The development of this 
financial instrument could ultimately enhance the government’s response to drought-induced 
food shortages, and mitigate the impact of weather-related shocks on macroeconomic 
performance, thereby facilitating investments, economic growth, and poverty reduction.   
 
Such innovative transaction was pioneered in 2008/2009, and was a first for a sovereign entity in 
Africa. The next step is for the Government of Malawi to build onto the initial pilot transaction 
and continue to pilot this instrument. In fact, several piloting seasons will be necessary to 
understand the scope and limitations of weather derivative contract, and its role within the 
government’s evolving strategy, contingency planning and operational drought response 
framework. The pilots should not aim to cover the entire financial magnitude of such a potential 
drought response in the country.  Rather they should provide coverage for a defined percentage 
of this risk as part of a broader (maize) risk management program and will test the feasibility and 
cost of transferring Malawi’s drought risk to the international risk markets.  The objective of 
piloting is not only to secure limited drought financing in a timely and objective manner but 
moreover to establish a price for Malawian drought risk.  In the future as more and more 
transactions of this type occur, as commercial portfolios become more diversified and the market 
                                                                                                                                                             
by the MMS and Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security). This will facilitate early decision making for superior 
risk management by Government and ultimately the development of a comprehensive risk management strategy for 
food security each season.  The investments will also further improve the underlying rainfall index for a derivative 
transaction by: a) expanding the MMS’s weather station network so that more stations can be included in the index, 
increasing its national coverage and therefore accuracy and; b) strengthening the early estimates of national maize 
production levels by linking the improved quality and timeliness of reported weather data with improved crop 
modeling. Upgrading will also provide the MMS the required capacity to communicate rainfall data reliably in real-
time to the World Meteorological Organization’s Global Telecommunications System (GTS).  This will help ensure 
that the Government will be able to access the international markets and benefit from such risk management 
products.   18
familiar with such new risk and clients, and as risk mitigation efforts in Malawi improve, it is 
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